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Abstract. In this paper we examine the support given for the ‘theory of formal discipline’
by Inglis and Simpson (2008). This theory, which is widely accepted by mathematicians and
curriculum bodies, suggests that the study of advanced mathematics develops general thinking
skills and, in particular, conditional reasoning skills. We further examine the idea that the dif-
ferences between the conditional reasoning behaviour of mathematics and arts undergraduates
reported by Inglis and Simpson may be down to different levels of general intelligence in the
two groups. The studies reported in this paper call into question this suggestion, but also cast
doubt on a straightforward version of the theory of formal discipline itself (at least with respect
to university study). The paper concludes by suggesting that either a pre-university formal
discipline effect or a filtering effect on ‘thinking dispositions’ may give a better account for
the findings.
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1. Introduction.
For many years mathematics has held a privileged place in most school cur-
ricula: it is typically compulsory for students to study the subject until an
older age, and for longer each week, than most other school subjects (Gill,
2003). Historically, one of the primary reasons for this privileged status is the
so-called ‘theory of formal discipline’: the idea that studying mathematics
develops thinking skills more generally.
Such views are widely held by modern mathematicians. The distinguished
algebraist Shimshon Amitsur was explicit about the link: “through mathemat-
ics we also wish to teach logical thinking — no better tool for that has been
found so far” (Sfard, 1998, p. 453) and a UK government report claimed that
“mathematical training disciplines the mind, develops logical and critical rea-
soning, and develops analytical and problem-solving skills to a high degree”
(Smith, 2004, p. 11). The theory is therefore not only of abstract interest,
but also has potentially important policy implications. Stanic (1986) demon-
strated that the differing status of mathematics in early twentieth century US
curricula was substantially related to changing attitudes towards the theory of
formal discipline, and Smith (2004) used the idea to argue that mathematics
c© 2008 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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2university students should receive tuition fee rebates, and school mathemat-
ics teachers should have targeted salary increases. On the other hand, the
privileged place of mathematics in the school curriculum has come under
recent attack, including from some sections of the mathematics education
community (Bramall and White, 2000). We believe that these policy debates
should be driven by empirical evidence.
Inglis and Simpson (2008) compared the inferences drawn from condi-
tional statements by university mathematics students and university students
from non-science subjects (used to represent a comparison group of non-
mathematical but well-educated people), and found that the mathematics
students endorsed fewer invalid inferences than the comparison group, and
were less affected by the affirmative premise effect (a reasoning bias which
has been shown to interfere with normative logical behaviour; Evans and
Handley, 1999). Inglis and Simpson suggested that their findings were
consistent with a version of the theory of formal discipline.
Notwithstanding their findings, there are two weaknesses to the study
which render the conclusions only suggestive. First, the study did not con-
trol for any differences in general intelligence between the two experimental
groups: perhaps the difference between the two groups lay in intelligence
rather than subject studied (or, indeed, perhaps the students with higher gen-
eral intelligence are disproportionately filtered into studying mathematics at
advanced levels, as suggested by Thorndike (1924)). Since general intel-
ligence measures are related to conditional reasoning measures (Newstead
et al., 2004; Stanovich and West, 2000), the differences found by Inglis and
Simpson might simply reflect this filtering effect.
Second, the theory of formal discipline implies that it is the study of math-
ematics which develops logical reasoning skills: the cross-sectional design of
Inglis and Simpson’s study could not address this development directly.
In this paper we report the findings of two studies designed to directly
address these issues; thereby providing a stronger test of the hypotheses that
underlie the theory of formal discipline.
2. Background.1
A typical abstract conditional inference task is shown in Figure 1. Partici-
pants are given an abstract conditional sentence, a premise and are asked to
decide whether a conclusion either follows or does not follow. Four different
conditional statements of the form ‘if p then q’ are possible by varying the
presence of negated components. Researchers have tended to focus on four
1 In the interests of brevity, this section only briefly revisits some of the theory behind the
analysis of conditional inference behaviour, and provides a short summary of earlier findings
(for a detailed account see Inglis and Simpson, 2008).
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3This problem concerns an imaginary letter-number pair. Your task is to decide whether or not
the conclusion necessarily follows from the rule and the premise.
Rule: If the letter is not T then the number is 6.
Premise: The number is not 6.
Conclusion: The letter is T.
© YES (it follows) © NO (no, it does not follow)
Figure 1. A typical conditional inference task (for the rule ‘if ¬p then q’, the inference MT,
and with an explicitly negated premise ‘¬q’).
Table I. The four conditional-types and four inference-types used in
the study. These gave rise to sixteen inferences, shown here with their
premises (Pr), conclusions (Con), inference-type and validity.
MP DA AC MT
Conditional Pr Con Pr Con Pr Con Pr Con
if p then q p q ¬p ¬q q p ¬q ¬p
if p then ¬q p ¬q ¬p q ¬q p q ¬p
if ¬p then q ¬p q p ¬q q ¬p ¬q p
if ¬p then ¬q ¬p ¬q p q ¬q ¬p q p
Inference-type affirmative denial affirmative denial
Validity valid invalid invalid valid
different inferences, two which are valid—modus ponens (MP) and modus
tollens (MT)—and two of which are invalid—denial of the antecedent (DA)
and affirmation of the consequent (AC). The premises and conclusions of
these four inferences are shown, with their validity and inference-type2, for
the four different conditional statements, in Table I.
Here we concentrate on two main effects which have been found to inter-
fere with normative conditional reasoning behaviour, the negative conclusion
effect and the affirmative premise effect (Evans, 2007). The negative con-
clusion effect refers to the observation that reasoners typically draw more
inferences with negative conclusions than inferences with affirmative con-
clusions. That is to say that the inference ‘if A then 3; ¬3; therefore ¬A’3
is drawn more often than the inference ‘if ¬A then 3; ¬3; therefore A’ de-
spite both being valid MT inferences (Evans et al., 1995; Evans and Handley,
1999; Schroyens et al., 2000). This is a robust effect on both denial inferences
2 The inference-type of an inference is defined as either ‘affirmative’ or ‘denial’ depending
on the valence of the conclusion drawn from the non-negated conditional ‘if p then q’.
3 The symbol ‘¬’ here should be read as “not”.
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4(DA and MT), but is only weakly observed (if at all) on AC, and never on MP
(Schroyens et al., 2001).
The affirmative premise effect refers to the finding that participants en-
dorse more inferences from affirmative premises than from negative premises.
It is primarily observed when those negative premises are represented implic-
itly. For example, the inference ‘if ¬A then 3; A; therefore ¬3’ is made more
often than the inference ‘if A then 3; R; therefore ¬3’, even though they are
both instances of drawing, invalidly, the DA inference (Evans and Handley,
1999).
Evans and Handley’s (1999) two hurdle account of conditional inference
brought together these two effects. They suggested that, in order to answer
a conditional inference task correctly, the reasoner must, first, avoid the af-
firmative premise effect, i.e. they must see that the premise is relevant to the
conditional statement (i.e. notice that R or ¬A is relevant for the conditional
‘if ¬A then 3’). Second, they must avoid the negative conclusion effect, i.e.
be able to convert the statement ‘¬¬p’ into ‘p’. It is only when both stages
are hurdled successfully that an inference can be made.
Inglis and Simpson (2008) found three main effects when comparing the
conditional inferences drawn by a group of mathematics undergraduates and
a groups of undergraduates studying for other degrees:
− overall, the mathematics group made fewer incorrect responses than the
comparison group;
− both groups exhibited the negative conclusion effect to approximately
the same extent;
− there was a significant between-groups difference with respect to the
affirmative premise effect: the comparison group showed the standard
effect, but the mathematics group showed no effect.
Inglis and Simpson speculated that this difference may be the result of the
mathematics undergraduates being better able to ‘see through’ opaque rep-
resentations4 than the comparison group (cf. Zazkis and Gadowsky, 2001;
Zazkis and Liljedahl, 2004). An important remaining question is: what is
the cause of this between-groups difference? The theory of formal discipline
would suggest that it is caused by the study of advanced mathematics. How-
ever, as discussed above, it may be that the two groups differed in general
intelligence, and that this difference lay behind the findings. The main aim of
our first study was to provide further evidence on this issue.
4 In the example above ‘R’ is a more opaque representation of p than ‘¬A’, and so it is
harder to see its relevance to the conditional ‘if ¬A then 3’.
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53. The comparative study.
Thus, the primary goals of the first study reported in this paper were (i)
to replicate the findings reported by Inglis and Simpson (2008); and (ii) to
determine whether these findings were consequences of different levels of
general intelligence between the mathematics and comparison groups.
3.1. METHOD.
Participants were first year undergraduate students studying at a highly-
ranked UK university. Two groups were recruited: a group of 45 students
studying for a degree offered by the Department of Mathematics (studying
either Mathematics, or a joint degree with a significant mathematics compo-
nent); and a group of 33 students studying a range of subjects which did not
involve a significant formal mathematics component (e.g. English Literature
or Chemistry). Both groups of participants had been highly successful in their
school career. Of those who had attended school in England or Wales, 73%
had achieved Advanced Level grades of AAA or higher.5 Most of the partic-
ipants in the mathematics group had studied both Mathematics and Further
Mathematics A–levels, and all but one had gained A grades in both.
Participants were given a booklet containing four sections. The first sec-
tion consisted of Part 1 of the AH5 intelligence test (Heim, 1968). This test,
designed for high achieving adults, contained 36 items in the categories ‘di-
rections’, ‘verbal analogies’, ‘numerical series’, and ‘similar relationships’.
The AH5 test has been widely used by earlier researchers, including by New-
stead et al. (2004) as part of their study of individual differences in reasoning
behaviour. Sections 2-4 of the booklet consisted of different reasoning tasks,
and were presented to participants in a counterbalanced order. In this paper
we report data from one of these sections: that which focussed on abstract
conditional inferences.
The conditional inference section of the instrument was identical to that
used by Inglis and Simpson (2008): it consisted of 32 reasoning problems of
the type shown in Figure 1.6 The inferences used are shown in Table I; half
of the problems used explicitly negated premises (e.g. ¬4 was represented as
“not 4”) and half used implicitly negated premises (e.g. ¬4 was represented
as, for example, “8”). The lexical content of the rules were generated ran-
domly and the order of the problems was randomised for each participant.
5 The Advanced Level (A–level) is the qualification taken by 18 year old school-leavers in
England and Wales. It is marked on a seven point scale from A (highest) to G (lowest), and
each candidate typically studies three (or sometimes four) subjects. In 2007 around 3% of 18
year olds across England and Wales achieved AAA or higher.
6 An explanation of why this task is particularly appropriate for investigating conditional
inference behaviour is given by Inglis and Simpson (2008).
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6Table II. The mean number of each inference correctly categorised by the mathematics
and comparison groups.
Explicit negations Implicit negations Overall
MP DA AC MT MP DA AC MT Total
Mathematics 3.97 2.93 2.07 2.41 3.76 3.10 2.38 2.48 23.10
Comparison 4.00 2.38 1.65 2.23 3.58 2.65 2.12 1.96 20.58
The instrument was preceded by the same instructions used by Inglis and
Simpson.
The task was administered to participants near the beginning of the uni-
versity year. No participant had yet attended more than one or two lectures or
tutorials. Participants spent twenty minutes on the AH5 test, after which they
were told to move on to the remainder of the task and complete it at their own
pace without returning to a problem after having moved on to another one.
3.2. RESULTS.
Participants’ AH5 scores were calculated, yielding a score out of 36. As ex-
pected, participants’ AH5 scores were positively correlated with the overall
number of inferences they correctly categorised, r = .485, p < .001. Fur-
thermore, the mathematics sample had a higher mean AH5 score than the
comparison sample, 19.1 vs 14.7, t(76) = 4.05, p < .001. To eradicate the
influence of general intelligence on the results the samples’ scores were bal-
anced by removing the highest scoring 16 participants from the mathematics
sample and the lowest scoring 7 participants from the comparison sample
from the analysis. This gave a mathematics group of 29 participants (mean
AH5 score 16.3; Std Dev 3.5) and a comparison group of 26 participants
(mean AH5 score 16.4; Std Dev 2.8).
Table II shows the mean number of correct inferences categorised by
both groups, for both explicitly- and implicitly-negated problems. Overall,
the mathematics group correctly categorised a higher number of inferences,
23.1, than the comparison group, 20.6, t(53) = 2.08, p = .043.
The main analysis followed that conducted by Inglis and Simpson (2008).
To interrogate the influence of the negative conclusion effect a Negative
Conclusion Index (NCI) was calculated, defined as the number of inferences
endorsed on arguments with affirmative conclusions subtracted from the num-
ber of inferences endorsed on arguments with negative conclusions. As the
number of each type of both valid and invalid inferences with negative and af-
firmative conclusions was equal, we would expect a participant exhibiting no
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7negative conclusion effect to attain an overall NCI of zero, and a participant
exhibiting the effect to show a positive NCI.
Participants’ NCIs were subjected to an analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with two within-participant factors (inference-type and negation-type), and
one between-participants factor (group). The inference-type factor was ob-
tained by collapsing the four inferences into two categories: affirmative
(MP and AC) and denial (DA and MT). The negation-type factor referred
to whether the inference involved explicitly negated premises or implicitly
negated premises. Thus the NCIs ranged from −4 to 4.
There was a significant effect for inference-type, F(1,53) = 16.4, p <
.001, with a mean NCI for denial inferences of 2.35 compared to 0.84 for
affirmative inferences. The mean NCIs for each group, for each inference-
type are shown on the left of Figure 2. There was no significant effect for
negation-type, nor were there significant inference-type × group, negation-
type × group or inference-type × negation-type × group interaction effects,
all Fs < 1.5.
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Figure 2. Left: The mean NCIs for each group, by inference-type. Right: The mean APIs for
each group, by negation-type. Error bars represent ±1 SE of the mean.
The affirmative premise effect was analysed by calculating an Affirmative
Premise Index (API), defined as the number of inferences endorsed on ar-
guments with negative premises subtracted from the number of inferences
endorsed on arguments with affirmative premises. As with the NCIs, we
would expect a participant exhibiting no affirmative premise effect to attain an
overall API of zero, and a participant exhibiting the effect to show a positive
API.
Participants’ APIs were subjected to an analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with two within-participant factors (validity and negation-type), and one
between-participants factor (group). The validity factor was obtained by col-
lapsing the four inferences into two categories: valid (MP and MT) and
invalid (DA and AC). The negation-type factor referred to whether the in-
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8ference involved explicitly negated premises or implicitly negated premises.
Thus, like the NCIs, the APIs ranged from −4 to 4.
As predicted by the literature there were significant effects for validity,
F(1,53) = 7.92, p = .007, and negation-type, F(1,53) = 6.61, p = .013. The
mean API was 0.62 for valid inferences compared to 1.36 for invalid infer-
ences, and 0.67 for explicit-negations compared to 1.31 for implicit negations.
There was no validity × group interaction, F < 1.5, but the negation-type
× group interaction did reach significance, F(1,53) = 5.31, p = .025. This
interaction is shown on the right of Figure 2. The comparison group showed
a large difference in affirmative premise effects between the two negation-
types, with a difference between the mean APIs of implicitly and explicitly
negated premises of 1.27, t(25) = 2.85, p = .009. In contrast the difference
for the mathematics group was only a non-significant 0.07. No significant va-
lidity× negation-type or validity× negation-type× group interaction effects
were found, Fs < 1.
3.3. DISCUSSION.
In this study we constructed groups balanced by AH5 scores, and used the
same instrument as Inglis and Simpson (2008) to interrogate conditional
inference behaviour. The findings of this study essentially replicated the ear-
lier study. First, overall the mathematics group had more correct responses
compared to the comparison group. Second, both groups exhibited the neg-
ative conclusion effect to approximately the same degree. And third, the
comparison group showed the standard affirmative premise effect, but the
mathematics group showed no effect.
Most importantly, the study demonstrates that the differences between the
mathematics and non-mathematics students detected by Inglis and Simpson
(2008) can not be accounted for by suggesting the two groups had differing
levels of general intelligence. However, while this finding is consistent with
the theory of formal discipline, on its own it does not provide overwhelm-
ing support for it. The cross-sectional nature of the study means it does not
provide compelling evidence that the study of mathematics develops logical
reasoning, the potential for a filtering effect (on a factor unrelated to general
intelligence) remains.
4. The longitudinal study.
To investigate the relationship further, we conducted a longitudinal study
which directly sought to address the developmental claim of the theory of
formal discipline. We asked the first year mathematics undergraduates from
the comparison study to return at the end of their first year of studies to
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9Table III. The mean number of each inference cor-
rectly categorised by the mathematics group in Ses-
sions 1 and 2.
MP DA AC MT Total
Session 1 7.82 6.52 5.39 5.06 24.79
Session 2 7.91 6.55 5.61 5.27 25.33
participate in a follow-up. If studying first year undergraduate mathematics
did develop logical reasoning skills, we would expect a different profile of
scores on the second administration.
4.1. METHOD.
All the participants from the mathematics sample in the comparison study
were invited to take part in a follow-up study at the end of their first year of
university mathematics studies. A total of 33 (of the 45) participants agreed to
take part. The follow-up instrument was administered in the same way as, and
was identical to, the first, except that the AH5 test was replaced by a separate
task designed to take approximately the same time.
Between the two studies participants had studied six modules towards
their mathematics degree, of which four were compulsory (with the other two
coming from a wide range of options). The content of the core modules in-
cluded some calculus, geometry, algebra, probability, analysis and dynamics,
as well as a module on problem solving designed to encourage ‘mathematical
thinking’ (partly based on Mason et al., 1982). The options included dis-
crete mathematics, data analysis, modelling and simulation. Although all the
modules integrated proof techniques into their syllabuses, only the discrete
mathematics module did so explicitly (with a formal description of proof by
induction and the pigeonhole principle). Note that no module contained any
explicit teaching of formal logic in the forms of propositional or predicate
calculus. Despite this, each module included “the development of abstract
reasoning” as a “non-specific” goal in its syllabus.
4.2. RESULTS.
The mean number of each inference correctly categorised by participants in
each session is shown in Table III. Although there was a slight improvement
in scores between the two sessions (of 1.8%), this difference was small and
did not approach significance, t(32) = 1.16, p > .25.
Participants’ NCIs were calculated for each of the two sessions and
analysed using an ANOVA with three within-participant factors (session,
long_reas8.tex; 25/10/2008; 17:21; p.9
10
negation-type and inference-type; defined in the same way as in the analysis
of the comparative study). There was a significant effect for inference-type,
F(1,32) = 19.1, p < .001, with a mean NCI for denial inferences of 1.09
compared to 0.29 for affirmative inferences. The mean NCIs for each session,
for each inference-type are shown on the left hand side of Figure 3. There
was no significant effect for session or negation-type, nor were there any
significant two- or three-way interaction effects, all Fs < 1.
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Figure 3. Left: The mean NCIs from each session, by inference-type. Right: The mean APIs
from each session, by negation-type. Error bars represent ±1 SE of the mean.
Participants’ APIs were calculated for the two sessions and analysed using
an ANOVA with three within-participant factors (session, negation-type and
validity; defined in the same way as in the analysis of the comparative study).
The main effect of validity was borderline significant, F(1,32) = 3.71,
p = .063, but no other main effect, two-way, or three-way interaction effect
approached significance, ps > .2. The mean APIs for each session, for each
negation-type are shown on the right hand side of Figure 3.
4.3. DISCUSSION.
The primary aim of the longitudinal study was to determine whether studying
first year undergraduate mathematics leads to a change in abstract conditional
inference behaviour. Such a change would provide compelling evidence for
the theory of formal discipline. However, no conditional inference index used
in this study showed a significant improvement between the first session at
the start of the year and the second session at the end. Students were not
significantly more accurate at categorising inferences at the end of their first
year, nor they did not show a reduced negative conclusion effect. In neither
session did the mathematics students show an affirmative premise effect.
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5. General discussion.
5.1. SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS.
The theory of formal discipline suggests that studying mathematics at ad-
vanced levels develops skills of logical thinking and, in particular, conditional
inference. In an earlier study, Inglis and Simpson (2008) demonstrated
that university mathematics students do seem to have a different profile of
responses to a series of conditional inference tasks compared to arts under-
graduates. However, it was unclear whether these differences were the result
of differing levels of intelligence between the groups, or whether the mathe-
matics students had—as suggested by the theory of formal discipline—been
influenced by their study of advanced mathematics.
In this paper we have extended the findings of Inglis and Simpson (2008)
in two significant ways. First, we demonstrated that the differences they
found cannot be accounted for by differing levels of general intelligence
between the groups. In the comparison study reported in this paper the groups
were balanced according to their scores on a widely used intelligence test,
and all the main findings of the earlier study were replicated. Second, we
demonstrated that the profile of responses to conditional inference tasks of
mathematics undergraduates did not change over the course of their first year
of studies. An essentially identical range of responses were given by the stu-
dents in the first week of their first year studies to those in the last week of
their first year studies, even though they had all studied a full programme
of proof-based mathematics modules in the intervening period; as well as a
problem solving module designed to develop ‘mathematical thinking’.
There would appear to be two reasonable hypotheses that can account
for these data. One possibility is that the differences identified between the
mathematics and comparison group in this study are developmental, but they
are the result of differences in study patterns which occur in pre-university
education, not at university. A second possibility is that the differences be-
tween the groups are not the direct result of instruction, and nor are they the
result of differences in intelligence, but rather are caused by between-group
differences on a separate unrelated factor. The most obvious candidate for
such a factor is an individual’s thinking disposition (sometimes referred to
as an individual’s cognitive style) which could act as a filter into (or out of)
mathematical study.
5.2. PRE-UNIVERSITY INSTRUCTION
One obvious way of accounting for the data reported in this paper would be to
suggest that studying pre-university mathematics develops logical reasoning
skills, but studying university mathematics does not. This would imply that
there is a limit to such development and that the limit is achieved between
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the end of compulsory mathematics and the start of university mathematics.
In the UK, where the large majority of our participants had attended school,
mathematics is a compulsory subject until the age of 16. At this point those
students who continue in education typically opt to study three or four sub-
jects (for the A Level qualification) until the age of 18. One of these subjects
can be mathematics and sometimes a second (“further mathematics”) is taken.
Perhaps it is this period of education which, following the theory of formal
discipline, caused the between-groups differences detected in the comparison
study.
To investigate this possibility further we conducted an informal analysis of
the comparison group who participated in the comparison study. Of course,
many of the students in the comparison group—who were studying subjects
at university with no significant mathematics component—had nevertheless
studied A–level mathematics prior to university (12 of the 33 fell into this
category). Those who had studied A–evel mathematics had a mean number
of inferences correctly classified of 21.1, compared to a figure of 20.1 for
those who had not studied A-level mathematics (with relatively high standard
deviations of 5.0 and 3.8 respectively). This difference did not approach sig-
nificance, t(31) = 0.591, p > .5. Although the small sample involved in this
comparison requires caution in interpreting this result, it certainly does not
provide any support to the hypothesis that the differences detected were the
result of pre-university but post-compulsory mathematical study.
5.3. DIFFERENCES IN ‘THINKING DISPOSITIONS’
In general, an individual’s ability to successfully perform a task will depend
on a number of factors: their background knowledge, their concentration, and
so on. However, sometimes a task is simply beyond the cognitive capacity
of an individual to perform: for example, the solution may require an algo-
rithm too complex to complete (such reasons for task failure are distinct from
one-off mistakes or performance errors). Individual differences in general
intelligence scores can be taken to reflect individual differences in cognitive
capacity (e.g. Baron, 1988); and it has been shown that an individual’s cogni-
tive capacity, measured in this way, tends to correlate with their performance
on a variety of reasoning tasks (e.g. Newstead et al., 2004; Stanovich and
West, 2000). However, in such studies cognitive capacity does not account
for all the variance in individual performances.
Stanovich (1999) pointed out that if an individual was operating close
to the limit of their cognitive capacity when tackling a reasoning task we
should expect a near perfect correlation between reasoning performance and
general intelligence. In fact the correlations found by researchers fall a long
way short of this (r = .485 in the current study). Stanovich attributed this,
at least in part, to individual differences in how individuals choose to allo-
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cate their cognitive resources: i.e. their thinking disposition (also variously
called cognitive style, or learning style). Various measures have been pro-
posed to measure differences in thinking disposition, leading to a diffuse
and poorly integrated literature (Coffield et al., 2004). Nevertheless, there
are some important findings relevant to the current discussion.
First, Stanovich and West (1998) found that an individual’s score on
a composite thinking dispositions inventory (designed to measure open-
mindedness, willingness to decontextualise and the tendency to consider
alternative opinions) was positively correlated with performance on a va-
riety of reasoning tasks (including some focused on conditional inference).
Second, there is some evidence that an individual’s thinking disposition is re-
lated to their performance in mathematics courses. Riding and Agrell (1997)
found a relationship between an individual’s profile on Riding’s (1991)
‘Cognitive Styles Analysis’ instrument and their performance on mathemat-
ics examinations at age 14-16; suggesting that access to post-compulsory
mathematical study (which is based, in part, upon school level examina-
tion performance) could be correlated with thinking dispositions. Similarly,
Drysdale et al. (2001) found that an individual’s classification on the Gre-
gorc (1979) Style Delineator predicted student performance on a first year
undergraduate course on linear methods (which included sections on ma-
trices, vectors, and determinants). Perhaps surprisingly, students classified
as being “ordered, perfection-oriented, practical and thorough” significantly
outperformed other groups, including those in a category described as “logi-
cal, analytical, rational and evaluative” (cf. Moutsios-Rentzos and Simpson,
2005).
These findings suggest that it is plausible that the differences found
between the groups in the comparison study are related to differences in
thinking disposition rather than differences in general intelligence. If, for
example, those in the mathematics group were more likely to engage in and
enjoy effortful analytic activity (i.e. be more willing to allocate their cognitive
capacity to solving abstract conditional inference tasks; cf. Cacioppo et al.,
1996), this could plausibly cause the between-groups differences in the pres-
ence of the affirmative premise effect (recall that avoiding this effect requires
the effortful realisation that, for example, the premise R is relevant to the
conditional ‘if ¬A, then 3’). In addition, one would presume (if Evans and
Handley’s (1999) account were correct) that the negative conclusion effect
would be more influenced by cognitive capacity than thinking disposition
(avoiding it requires the cognitively demanding task of holding in mind a se-
ries of deductive steps, and then converting the statement ‘¬¬p’ into ‘p’), and
thus—as we found—one might not expect any between-group differences.
However, it is worth emphasising that this account, that the between-
groups differences found in the comparison study are the result of group
differences in thinking disposition, while being inconsistent with a straight-
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forward version of the theory of formal discipline, need not necessarily be
inconsistent with the theory entirely. Although an individual’s thinking dis-
position may influence their success in mathematical study, the reverse may
also be the case: i.e., that studying mathematics influences a persons’ thinking
disposition, which in turn influences their logical reasoning skills. Indeed
Kolb (1984) suggested that “people choose fields that are consistent with their
learning styles and are further shaped to fit the learning norms of their field
once they are in it” (p. 88); i.e. that thinking dispositions and study choices
can reinforce each other.
6. Concluding remarks.
Inglis and Simpson (2008) found that mathematics and other undergraduates
behaved differently when asked to judge the validity of abstract conditional
inferences. In this paper we have demonstrated that this difference cannot be
accounted for by differing levels of general intelligence between the groups.
However, we have also shown that mathematics undergraduates do not show
any development on any conditional inference measures over the course of
their first year university studies.
At first glance these results appear contradictory. The first is consistent
with the theory of formal discipline, the second appears not to be. However,
we have outlined two possible hypotheses which account for these findings.
First, that any developmental gains due to non-compulsory mathematical
study take place in pre-university courses, rather than at university. Sec-
ond, that the between-group differences found in these studies are the result
of group differences in intelligence-independent thinking dispositions. This
latter hypothesis is potentially consistent with both the theory of formal dis-
cipline (where initial minor differences in thinking dispositions are reinforced
through mathematical study) and its negation (where initial large differences
in thinking dispositions cause some to filter into studying mathematics, and
some not to). If empirical mathematics education research is to usefully con-
tribute to the policy debates discussed earlier, then further studies will need
to distinguish between these two hypotheses.
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